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Introduction
This paper looks at the issue of ethnic identity of the descendants of Dungan Chinese
migrants and its change and preservation in the context of the fragile social fabric of the
Central Asian states that were reborn from the shadow of the non-defunct Soviet Union,
and the arduous processes of nation-building plagued by often violent, competing
emergent nationalisms as weII as political and economic turbulence. These Chinese-
speaking Dungans mostly staying in compact communities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan are descendants of political and war refugees (in contrast to Chinese
migrants in Southeast Asia, Europe and the Americas who were mainly economic
migrants) from China's provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu who moved across the border
into the territory of Czarist Russia in the later part of the nineteenth century after the
crushing of the Northwest Uprising by the Imperial Ch'ing (the Manchu dynasty) army
which bordered on genocide and ethnic cleansing. After arriving in Russian Central Asia,
these early landless Chinese migrants were aIIowed by the Czarist government to reclaim
wasteland for farming and engage in livestock husbandry. In early twentieth century,
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these Chinese migrants and their descendants also actively participated in the
construction of the former Soviet Union and Stalin's war against the Third Reich's
invasion in the 1940s.
This paper analyzes how a new Dungan ethnic identity has since emerged due
partly to the geographical isolation imposed by the formidable natural barrier of the
Tianshan ("Heavenly Mountain") and partly to the ambiguous sentiments towards the
ancestral homeland of Zhongyuan given the collective memory of the tragic exodus (the
earlier generations of these Chinese migrants in Central Asia used to call themselves
($u1j-ia_nziYj, i.e. "people of/from Chungylian" - "Chungylian" or "Chungt'u", literally
"Middle Land" or "Middle Earth", being a common Chinese expression in the old days
referring to China). However, the Chinese language in the form of a mixture of the
Shaanxi and Gansu regionalects remarkably written today not in Chinese characters but
in the Cyrillic alphabet, and Chinese traditions of the Shaanxi and Gansu varieties have
been fiercely preserved through the generations until today, including nineteenth-century
vocabulary and traditions which are no longer found in modem China, due both to the
cohesiveness of communal life and an aversion to marriage outside the community.
Besides analyzing the Dungan community's dilemmas of identity preservation
and identity creation, this paper also looks at the impact of the disintegration of the Soviet
union in 1991 and the birth of the post-Soviet independent Central Asian republics on
these descendants of Chinese migrants. The influx of the new Chinese migrants since the
early 1990s that has triggered xenophobic response in many Central Asian societies is
also adding a new dimension to the existing set of new challenges faced by the Dungans
today brought about both by the onslaught of nationalisms of the new politically
dominant ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and the economic
turmoil faced by these new republics following the collapse of the Soviet command
economy, which in a violent form, resulted in the severe interethnic clashes between the
Chinese-speaking and Turkic-speaking youths in Iskra, near the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek,
in February 2010 which sent a tremor through Kyrgyzstan's delicate ethnic social fabric
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that is still licking its wounds after the Kyrgyz-Uzbek clash in 1991 that claimed more
than 300 lives.
The Iskra Ethnic Riots
On 6th February 2010, severe ethnic clashes broke out between the Chinese-speaking
Dungan (or "Tungan") youths and Turkic-speaking Kyrgyz youths in the Dungan-
majority village of Iskra, about 70 kilometers from Kyrgyz capital Bishkek (called
Frunze in the Soviet period), sending a tremor through Kyrgyzstan's delicate ethnic
\
social fabric. The Chinese Dungans (JJ:YHraHeDungani), while comprising up to 90 per
cent ofIskra's 3,000 residents, are but one of the smallest minority groups in Kyrgyzstan,
numbering around 50300, and in Kazakhstan (numbering also about 50300) and
Uzbekistan (about 20200). The first sign of trouble came a week earlier on the night of
31st January when two Kyrgyz boys were allegedly beaten by six Dungan youths in a
dispute over a seat in a local computer center. Tension rapidly escalated, culminating in
large Kyrgyz demonstrations on 4th-5th February that demanded the forced removal of
the six Dungan youths involved in the brawl, along with their families. Situation got
worse when on 5th February four Dungan youths in a speeding car allegedly fired
gunshots at the Kyrgyz protesters, triggering a rampage by the Kyrgyz demonstrators in
which Dungans were beaten and houses were set on fire, forcing some Dungan families
to seek refuge in a local mosque. When order was restored on 6th February, 20 people
had been injured, 40 people had been arrested and about 30 homes had been destroyed.
While the Iskra village administration has been blamed by the Dungans for
allegedly taking side with the ethnic Kyrgyz and participating in the violence against the
Dungans, the Kyrgyz government attributed the clashes to three major factors - economic
malaise, social problems and interethnic misunderstanding. These severe clashes are
particularly alarming given the fact that the two ethnic communities have been living
peacefully with each other all along. However, tensions have been accumulating in recent
years. Apparently, the Dungans have not been spared in the general rising interethnic
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tensions that afflicted the Central Asian republics amidst the political and socioeconomic
upheavals following the their independence from Soviet Union that collapsed in 1990.
Flight from Zhongyuan 1: Historical Geography of Ethnicity of a Forgotten People
Referred to by historians as the largest overseas' Chinese migrant community and the
largest overseas Shaanxi(-Gansu) migrant community', the 120000-strong Dungans also
represent the largest Chinese Muslim community outside China, with 50000 found in
Kazakhstan, 50000 in Kyrgyzstan and 20000 in Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, there are
\
12000 to 13000 Dungans in Sokuluk (Saohulu; about 30 km west of Bishkek) including
the adjacent Aleksandrovka (AJIeKcaH'[(poBKa), 5000-10000 in Milianfan (or
Miliangchuan) (about 60 km west of Tokmok and 60 km northeast of Bishkek), about
3300 in Bishkek, 2800 in Yrdyk (Erdaogou), 1500 in Ivanovka and 800-2500 in Osh
(Aoshe). In Kazakhstan, there are 7000-12000 Dungans in MasanchilMasanchin
(MaCaHQlMacaHQI-IH;8 km north of Kyrgyzstan's Tokmok) which before 1965 was called
Karakunuz (KapaKYHY3,Kapaxonsra, meaning the breeding place of black beetles), 9000-
12000 in Sortobe (CopT06/111opTIo6 Xinqu; a few km downstream from Tokmok and
south of Masanchi/Karakunuz) and 3000-5000 in Zhalpak-tobe (,ll>KaJIrraK).
It would not be inappropriate to refer to the Dungan Chinese as a "forgotten
people", for despite the fact that, as mentioned above, they constitute the largest Chinese
community outside People's Republic of China and Taiwan, there was, for instance, no
record of their existence in the authoritative Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas
published in 1999.
Other than the traditional Dungan villages, many Dungans also live in the nearby
cities, such as Bishkek, Tokmok (TOKMOK,Russian "Tokmak" (ToKMaK)), Karakol.
Masanchin, known to Dungans traditionally as Ingpan (Yingpan - Dungan "HHHnaH" or
Russian "Husnan"), however, has a particular significance, being the heartland of the
Dungan people and their earliest settlement in Central Asia. Karakunuz was renamed in
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1965 Masanchi or Masanchin, after Magazi Masanchi or Masanchin, a prominent
Dungan during the Communist Revolution and a Soviet Kazakhstan statesman, Magazi
Masanchi had great contribution to the building of the Soviet regime in Central Asia and
founded the School of Dungan Culture in Almaty in the 1930s. He was killed in 1936 in
Stalin's purge. The Masanchin village's traditional Dungan name HHHnaH (Ingpan) is a
Chinese military term meaning "a camp" or "an encampment". The military flavour of
the name indeed captures well the background of historical geography of the Dungan
ethnicity in Central Asia.
The etymology of the name Dungan (or Tungan) remains uncertain. The Dungans
\
actually continue to refer to themselves, as in China, as the Hui people (huizu - Dungan
"xy3ii:3)'" [xu€idzu]), while their Turkic- and Tajik-speaking neighbours in Xinjiang and
the Central Asian states and the Russians refer to them as the Dungans - Russian plural
)J.YHraHe(dungane), singular )J.YHraHHH(dunganin), probably derived from Turkic doiian
("one who turns"), similar in meaning to the Chinese hui. Some scholar thought that it
could have meant Eastern Gansu province from which many of the Dungans' forefathers
came, despite the fact that the character "gan" in the Dungans' Chinese ethnic name
"Donggan" is different from that in the name of Gansu province. Others attributed the
name to Turkic Turup Qalghan, meaning "people who have settled down", or Chinese
dong-an ("east bank", referring to the east bank of the Yellow River where these people
originally came from), or "Tongguan" (the place and nearby area in today's Shaanxi
province where some of these people came from), or even "Dunhuang" (which is situated
on the these people's route of migration into Czarist Russia). In the past the Dungans
used to call themselves tsun-ianzin (zhongyuanren, literally "people of/from zhongyuan"
- "zhongyuan", literally "Middle Land", was a common Chinese expression referring to
China) (Rimski-KorsakoffDyer, 1981: 46-47).
The pattern of distribution of the Dungans in Central Asia is similar to that of the
Hui Muslims in China - the overall scattering of small concentrations. They are in
general scattered among the rural and urban areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, in particular their respective capital cities of Almaty (former capital),
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Bishkek and Toshkent (Tashkent), However, whether in the urban or rural areas, the
Dungans tend to live closely together in compact communities. The 120000 Dungans in
the three Central Asian states are living on/in about 30 farms or urban compact
communities. The distances between Dungan communities range from just 2 km (e.g.
from Kazakhstan's Sortobe to Kyrgyzstan's Tokmok) to thousands of kilometres (e.g.
from Kazakhstan's Almaty to Uzbekistan's Toshkent). The largest number of Dungan
farming communities are in Kyrgyzstan; Kazakhstan has a smaller number but with large
areas and number of people. Eighty per cent of the Dungans mainly live on the plains on
the banks of the Chui River that forms a natural border between Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, with the majority on the 200 km long, 80 km wide fertile plain of the Chui
\
River around the capital Bishkek of the otherwise mountainous Kyrgyzstan. From
Masanchin/lngpan, the first Dungan farming community, in the centre of the Alatau
("Ala-Too" in Kyrgyz) ranges of the Tianshan, crossing the Chui River about 9 km away
is the city of Tokmok, and from around Tokmok the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek and to
Sokuluk in the south, Dungans are distributed among the 20 or so farms, towns and cities
on the plain all within an area of 100 km from east to west, 50 km from north to south.
There are four phases in the history of the Dungan Chinese migration to Central
Asia, reflecting closely the sociopolitical development of China.
The first phase of the Dungan Chinese migration was related to China's
northwestern Muslim rebellion against the imperial Ch'ing (Qing) court during the period
1862-1877, From late November 1877, defeated rebels retreated in three batches into
Russian territory, The first batch consisted of a few thousand people from Gansu
Province's Didaozhou, led by Ahong (Imam) Ma Yusu or Ma Yuan (also known as the
"Didao Old Man"). The group entered Russian territory by crossing the Tianshan (tian
"heaven", shan "mountain") at the northwest of Aksu (in Xinjiang), Many died from the
extreme cold while crossing Tianshan, the surviving 1116 people finally settled in late
1877 and the spring of 1878 in the village of Yrdyk (blpl1.bIKIErdaogou, some 15 km
southwest from Karakol in Eastern Kyrgyzstan). The second batch, over 10000 fighters
and their family members from Shaanxi Province, led by the legendary Mohammad Ayub
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Bai Yanhu/Bo Yanhu, first retreated to Kashgar in Southern Xinjiang and crossed the
Tianshan, and reached the Russian territory on 6th December 1877, and then Tokmok (in
northwestern Kyrgyzstan) on 27th December 1877, finally settled in the village of
Karakunuz (later Masanchin) in Kazakhstan, about 8 km north from Tokmok. Only 3314
out of the original 10000 survived the Tianshan ordeal on arrival. The third batch
consisted of those from Qinghai and Xinjiang's Turfan, led by Ma Daren ("The Great
Master Ma"), who moved southward from Kashgar to Central Asia in early December
1877 and after a few months' trekking reached Osh in February 1878 with a number of
1779 people. Some of them who were from Qinghai continued to move on to Zhambyl in
Kazakhstan, while those who remained in Osh were later assimilated by the Uzbeks.
\
Upon arrival, the Czarist government gave these refugees 5000 hectares of land
and 10-year exemption from tax." Beginning from Karakunuz (later Masanchin, which
the Dungans call Ingpan), Dungan farming villages gradually proliferated to the
surrounding areas.
The second phase of the Dungan Chinese migration was related to the Treaty of
Saint Petersburg signed in February 1881, whose terms required the withdrawal of the
Russian troops from the Upper IIi Basin (the Kulja area). With the return of IIi, which
was annexed by Czarist Russia on 4th July 1871, to China in March 1882 and the leaving
of the Russian troops, the Hui in IIi were in fear of vengeance by the Ch'ing army due to
their sympathy for the 1862-1877 anti-Ch'ing northwestern Muslim rebellion. Iii's Hui
merchant Ma Cong led six others on 3rd July 1881 to explore places including Verny
(Almaty was called Verny before 1921, and Alma-Ata from 1921 to 1992), Zhambyl and
Bishkek, and finally selected the fertile Sokuluk by the Chui River, which was sparsely
populated. Many hence moved to Sokuluk. Iii was returned to China on 18th March 1882.
According to Russian customs record, on 20th March 1882 there was an exodus of 486
families (comprising 2457 people) from Iii, with 916 carriage of goods and furnitures.
Many of the migrants were settled in Almaty, PanfiJov (I1aH<inIJIOB),Horgosh and
Sokuluk. Following the departure of these wealthy residents, another group of Hui -
mostly poor families - also migrated in the same direction in the spring of the following
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year. However, unlike the richer migrants in the previous year, this batch of 5000 people
who migrated on feet - nick-named by the earlier migrants as diaowazi (the "left-behind
kids") - settled mostly in Panfilov and Horgosh, only about 80 km from China's border.
According to the Russian statistics, a total of 4682 Hui Chinese moved to the Russian
Empire under the Treaty of Saint Petersburg. With these waves of migration, there were
about a total of 15000 Dungan Chinese migrants in Russian territory by the year 1883.
The third phase of Dungan Chinese migration occurred during the period 1957-
1962, and the migrants were Muslims from Xinjiang. A large number of Kazakhs,
Uighurs and Hui Chinese Muslims crossed the border into Russian territory in early May
\
1962 and settled in the village of Sortobe (Xinqu) and the town of Ivanovka between
Tokmok and Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. These new migrants from China were called "No.
8" by the local Dungans, probably following the contingent number of the Chinese border
troop there at that time.
We could add a fourth phase of migrants - these are the familiar new migrants
(xinyimin) after China implemented the "Reform and Open" policy, especially after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.
While the present Dungan people are the third (ageing) or fourth generations of
descendants of their forefathers who migrated from Shaan-Gan (China's provinces of
Shaanxi and Gansu) over a century ago, their have maintained their Chinese ethnic
identity both through the fiercely guarded traditions and way of life, including the
Shaanxi dialect of the Chinese language uniquely written phonetically in the Cyrillic
alphabet, and a strong sense of being the descendants of a prosecuted people, exiled in a
foreign land, especially among the third generation who are today in their seventies or
eighties. Unlike Chinese in Southeast Asia, Australia, Europe and the Americas who are
in the main descendants of economic migrants from the eastern coastal region of China,
the Dungans in Central Asia are mostly descendants of political/war refugees from
northwestern China escaping the genocidal troops of the imperial Ch'ing-dynasty
government. The term "genocidal" is not an exaggeration. Close to a million Hui Chinese
8
Yeah, Liu & Fan International Conference on Chinese Migrants' Descendants 23-24 March 2011
Muslims were slaughtered in Shaanxi alone and 800 mosques burnt when in November
1869 Ayub Bai Yanhu led his Shaanxi Muslim rebels retreating to Jingjibao (in today's
Ningxia) under the attack of the Ch'ing troop led by Zuo Zongtang who just defeated the
(Christian) Taiping rebellion. When Jingjibao fell in November 1870, more than 170
members of the various generations of the family of Ma Hualong, the Muslim leader who
surrendered, were executed. Ma Hualong was tortured and killed in 1872, his heart dug
out, his head paraded and burnt. A total of 1800 people were mass slaughtered, and it was
alleged that during the gruesome torture of Ma Hualong and his people, seven layers of
carpets were used to avoid the "rebel blood" from getting into the ground and "breeding
rebel seed". When Zuo Zongtang's troops took Suzhou (in today's Gansu), up to about,
10000 Hui Muslims were slaughtered, including the old, the women and the children.
Zuo's military crime against humanity was so gruesome that it was even chided by the
Ch'ing court's civilian officials. The imperial (Manchu) Ch'ing government was not
known to be sympathetic to rebels. Between 1648 and 1878, around twelve million Hui
and Han Chinese were killed in ten unsuccessful uprisings, and the Ch'ing court's harsh
suppression of these revolts was nothing less than genocidal, including the mass
slaughtering of several million Hui Muslims in the "Hui-c1eansing" (xi hui) policy that
had been long advocated by officials in the Ch'ing government. Before the war against
the rebels, there was a total population of about 13 million people in Shaanxi province, at
least 1,750,000 of whom were Hui Muslims, and the province's population dropped to 7
million after the war. There was a mass exodus from Xi'an, the capital of Shaanxi
province, which was the holy city of the Hui Muslims before the revolt, and Shaanxi
province's once-flourishing Hui Muslim population suffered a decline of 93 per cent. The
Ch'ing court's Hui-cleansing campaigns, hence, were quite a success. However, to be fair
to the Ch'ing government, while not denying the gruesome war atrocities committed
against the Muslim civilians, the Ch'ing armies only massacred the Muslims in areas that
had rebelled, and spared Muslims in areas which took no part in the uprisings. Many Hui
Muslim generals who helped the Ch'ing court to defeat the Muslim rebels were rewarded
and their followers were spared from the genocide. General Zuo Zongtang, who was a
Han Chinese, even relocated the Han people from the Hezhou suburbs to reward the
Muslims there who surrendered and were granted amnesty and allowed to live as long as
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they stayed outside the city. Muslims in eastern and southern China did not revolt and
hence were not affected by the rebellion and experienced no genocide. In fact, in Henan
province which was adjacent to Shaanxi, Muslim villages were said to be totally
unaffected by the Shaanxi rebellion.
Dungans' Challenges in the Transition Economies
Today's Dungan people in Sortobe work mainly as traders (50 per cent) and farmers (30
per cent), followed by government employees (10 per cent) and others (10 per cent,
\
mainly in companies and as entrepreneurs), according to information conveyed by Hussin
Darurov Shimarovich (An), the president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan,
recently over the telephone to the authors (lOth February 2011). (Like all Dungans, he
has a Russified surname Shimarovich when he is outside the Dungan villages, as well as
a Chinese surname An known among the Dungan people.' Similarly, Dungans speak
Russian outside the Dungan villages, but revert to the Dungan Chinese tongue when they
return to the Dungan villages (Li, 2008).) Sortobe (or known to the Dungans as Xinqu)
has 19000 people, 99 per cent are Dungans, and the rest are Russians and Uyghurs, but
these other ethnic group can also speak the Dungan language. According to An, 99 per
cent of the population has education up to the secondary school level, but today only 30
per cent have university education, in contrast to 60 per cent during Soviet time. The
latter fact that An conveyed is a reflection of the new challenges faced by the Dungans in
the new-born Central Asian states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The February
2010 Dungan-Kyrgyz ethnic clash in Iskra was the climax of such new unease since the
leaving of the Russian overlord and the upsurge of the local KyrgyzlKazakhlUzbek
nationalisms from the peripheral in former Soviet Union to the mainstream in these new-
born Central Asian Republics after the dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR). The rise of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek nationalism since Kazakhztan's,
Kyrgyzstan's and Uzbekistan's independence in 1991, with alarming war cries like
"Kazakhstan belongs to the Kazakhs" and "Kyrgyzstan is for the Kyrgyz", and the
leaving of many Russian (e.g., over 2 million Russians have moved to Russia, reducing
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Kazakhstan's population from 17 million to 15 million) and the Kazakh-, Kyrgyz- and
Uzbek-ization of the civil service in these three states where Dongans domicile do reflect
the unmistakable objective ethnic situation these countries are undergoing. Before the
unprecedented violent ethnic clash with the Kyrgyz in February 2010, the Dungans,
partly due to their small number, usually stay out of such conflicts, such as the large-scale
interethnic violence between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1991
which resulted in tremendous loss of lives.
. Just like other communities of the Chinese diaspora worldwide, the Dungans are
economically sl;lccessful - and doing better economically in general than the local
dominant ethnic group (Kyrgyz/Kazakhs/Uzbeks) but they are usually politically inactive,
again, partly due to their small number. The mounting challenges the Dungans are facing
right now in the post-Soviet Union era is most apparently reflected in the negative impact
on education, as shown above by the figures conveyed by An about the Dungans in
Sortobe. During the Soviet era, before the present rise of local ethnic nationalism,
university education was encouraged and paid by the government, hence the number of
Dungan university students was substantial and the Dungans as a whole enjoyed high
education standards. In fact, it is truly remarkable that while the early political and war
refugees escaping through Tianshan into Central Asia more than a century ago were
mostly poor illiterate peasants, their descendants would soon boast of a rich body of poets,
scholars, academics, teachers, medical doctors and other professionals. However, with
the new-found independence of these Central Asian states and the accompanying
economic and fiscal problems, the new governments no longer pay for university
education, and that has led to an apparent decline in the university enrolment of Dungans.
Besides that, the Dungans are also facing new economic challenges because their wealth
which depended formerly on high income from the sales of their vegetables and other
crops is badly hit by these new countries' loss of the important Russian demand, leading
to shortage of demand and low prices. While there had been many Dungans working in
the government departments and universities of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan during the
Soviet era, this is no longer so today since the independence of these countries. In fact,
many Dungan university graduates today are forced to become vegetable farmers or go
11
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into business. For example, in Kyrgyzstan in 2002, the monthly salary of a university
professor is merely US$25, and the researchers in the renowned Institute of Dungan
Studies of the Kyrgyzstan National Science Academy have a monthly salary of only
about US$15, hence they are forced to supplement their incomes by working also as
hawkers in the streets. Some Dungan professionals in fact lost their jobs overnight at the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and turned into hawkers. Take the case of a prominent
descendant of Mohammad Ayub Bai Yanhu, the legendary leader of the 1877 "Long
March" through Tianshan - Abdullah Ayub Baiyanhu, now in Naryn (Hapsm, in eastern
Kyrgyzstan, close to the Chinese border), the first resting place of Ayub Bai Yanhu and
his followers when they crossed Tianshan in December 1877. Originally a professional
\
with university degree, now he is a restaurant owner. This is a common phenomenon
today.
The dissolution of the' Soviet Union has had adverse impact on the cultural
domain too. During the Soviet era, publication of Dungan newspapers and school
textbooks were the responsibility of the government. No longer now. Dungan presses
virtually died overnight at the disintegration of the USSR. The first Dungan newspaper,
the Dongfang Huoxing Baa ("Eastern Fire Seeds") was born in 1932, the year the
Dungan script switched from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet, which later was further
converted into the Cyrillic in 1954. Due to the political environment, the paper was
renamed Siiyoti ts 'i (in Russian Znamia Oktiabria, i.e. "October Banner"). In 1980, it was
rename again as the Sulian Huimin Baa ("Soviet Union Huimin Press" - Huimin means
"the Hui people"). While not using Chinese characters but the Cyrillic alphabet, the
Dungan newspaper Dongfang Huoxing Baa can be considered one of the earliest Chinese
newspapers published by the Overseas Chinese. Other than a break during the Second
World War, the Dungan newspapers had not stop publishing, and the operating expenses
of the newspapers and the newspaper publishers were paid for and publicly run by the
Soviet government. With Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan attaining independence upon the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Dungan Association of Kyrgyzstan took
up the responsibility of publishing the "Huimin Press", and Dungan Association of
Kazakhstan took up the publication of the "Huizu Press" (Huizu means "the Hui race") or
12
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"Shaanxi Huizu Press". However, now without government sponsorship, the papers are
sometimes forced to stop publishing due to problems with operating expenses. The
"Huizu Press" of Kazakhstan now only publishes an issue every three months.
Preservation of Chinese Culture and Creation of New Ethnic Identity
While having been living for more than a century scattering around Central Asia which is
inhabited by a great many ethnic groups, the Dungans' cultural memory of their Chinese
homeland has not bedimmed with the passage of time. Today, over 90 per cent of the
\
Dungans still speak the Shaanxi and Gansu regionalects of China and follow closely their
forefathers' traditional way of life whether in dietetic habits, dressing, housing or the Hui
Muslim religion of northwest China.
From the original 10941 people who survived the exodus through Tianshan to
move into Czarist Russia in 1877, 1878 and 1879, the Dungan Chinese Muslim
population in Central Asia has today increased nine-fold over the hundred years. As the
descendants of early migrants from Shaanxi and Gansu who escaped persecution and
genocide at home and who were survivals of the ordeal through Tianshan (only about 30
per cent survived this "Long March", the rest died under the swords of the pursuing
Ch'ing army, or from cold and hunger on the "Heavenly Mountain"), the Dungan
Chinese have long been noted for their fierceness in preserving the Chinese culture
within their diasporic communities. Besides, the Dungans also retain the use of all
traditional Chinese musical instruments like erhu, banhu, di, sheng etc. and traditional
Chinese medicine and medical practices, as well the use of nongli (the Chinese lunar
calendar) in farming activities (Zhi, 2004). Besides their preservation of the Shaan-Gan
regionalect (the so-called Dungan language written not in Chinese characters but in a
phonetic script) and the publication of the Dungan language newspapers and the use of
the Dungan language textbooks from primary school to secondary school, the
preservation of the Chinese culture is also reflected in women's attire and headgears that
are Ch'ing dynasty in origin which no longer survive in the Chinese communities
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elsewhere, and Ch'ing-era bride and bridegroom costumes in marriage ceremonies.
Arranged marriages (through parents and matchmakers) still survive in today's Dungan
communities, especially rural. Even everyday vocabulary reflects the archaic Ch'ing
dynasty influence, e.g. calling a premier or president huangshang or huangdi ("emperor"),
government department yamen, policeman yayi ("yamen runner"), complaining or
petitioning shang zhuangzi, government officer daren ("lord"), shopkeeper zhangguide,
writer/poet xiejia, airplane Jengchuan ("wind-ship") or tieJengzheng ("iron kite"), dowry
peijang, child wa, girl niiwa, village cadre bangban, matches yanghuo ("Western fire"),
and people coming from China qingguoren ("people from the Ch'ing Empire"). In short,
the Dungans' Chinese language has remained the late-Ch'ing version. Liu (2004) in his
\
elegiac poetic travelogue Bei Yue Tianshan [Sad exodus over the Heavenly Mountain]
told of hearing Shaanxi children's rhymes, which are now mostly lost in Shaanxi, still
being sung in the Dungan villages - a remarkable preservation of traditions of their
forefathers who' escaped to Central Asia more than a century ago, as described by
Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer (1981) as the most valuable aspect of Dungan conservatism:
The most valuable aspect of the conservatism of both groups lies in the fact that they have
preserved many songs, riddles, legends, stories, ceremonies and customs brought from China
one hundred years ago.
(Rimski-KorsakoffDyer, 1981: 49)
The two groups Rimski-KorsakoffDyer referred to are the Shensi (Shaanxi) Dungans and
the Kansu (Gansu) Dungans. Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer observed that the more
conservative of the two were the Shaanxi Dungans whose women still observed the
custom of foot-binding as recently as 1948 and who dislike their daughters marrying
Kazakhs or Kyrgyz (even though all were Muslims) or even the Gansu Dungans who
often live just nearby (Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 49). Hence, the Dungans have often
been seen as the most conservative in terms of interethnic integration. Most Dungans, in
general, still value intra-Dungan marriages.
Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, while noting the remarkable conservatism of the
Dungans, also described that in some way they could be the most progressive among the
Chinese communities in terms of language. Firstly, while all the past attempts (including
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Mao Zedong's) at alphabetizing the Chinese writing system have failed, the Dungans
have succeeded. Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer attributed this to several crucial factors:
While the Chinese are very attached to their characters, the Dungans, with the exception of
the mullahs, arrived in Russian territory one hundred years ago as illiterate peasants.
Consequently for them there was no emotional trauma involved in changing their way of
writing and abandoning the characters that mean so much to most Chinese [... ] The reasons
why the Dungans could survive without characters is because they knew no characters in the
first place; because they speak only two dialects which are similar to each other; and because
they live among people who are all familiar with the Cyrillic alphabet.
(Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 50)
Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer also gave a second reason why she considered the Dungans
\
linguistically progressive: while all other varieties of the Chinese language have many
classifiers, the Dungans are gradually abolishing most the classifiers and are nowadays
using only one general classifier ki (ge in putonghua pinyin) at least in speech. If it has
been a fact that many Chinese speakers (including the speakers of the regionalects)
frequently in informal speech unconsciously replacing the correct classifiers with ge, then
the Dungans are indeed progressive in gradually phasing out all classifiers but one far
ahead of the Chinese speakers elsewhere.
In fact, the Dungans also embody a microcosm of the Hui people of China. In
terms of geographical origin, their forefathers came from mainly Shaanxi and Gansu, but
also Qinghai and Xinjiang of China; in sectarian terms, the Dungans comprise Muslims
of the Jahriyya, Qadim and Ikhwan sects; in terms of language, besides the Shaanxi and
Gansu regionalects, the Dungans also speak the Qinghai and Hezhou regionalects of
China. The majority of the Dungans inYrdyk belong to the Jahriyya sect - one of the
many sects of China's Hui which also include Qadim, Khufiyya, Ikhwan, etc. Like the
Khufiyya, the Jahriyya is a branch of the Naqshbandiyya, the largest Sufi brotherhood in
Central Asia. The Jahriyya is one of the four main groups of menhuan, which also
include the Kubrawiyya, the Khufiyya and the Qadariyya. Menhuan is the Sufi order of
the Hui people; for instance, there are three main Khufiyya menhuan evolved in China's
Ningxia Hui Zizhiqu ("Autonomous Region") since the end of the Ch'ing dynasty - the
Xianmen, the Tonggui and the Hongmen menhuan (Yeoh, 2006a: 9-10). In a way, the
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Dungan exodus can also be seen as an epitome of the Chinese migration overseas from
the late 19th Century to early 20th Century, and the Dungans in Central Asia are but a
microcosm of the Hui of China. In fact, the early Hui who escaped from China in 1877
seemed to have fled in batches according to provincial origin and sect. In terms of
provincial origin (jiguan), they were almost all from Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai
and Xinjiang. In terms of language, they spoke the Chinese regionalects common to
China's Hui, i.e. the local dialects of Shaanxi, Qinghai, Hezhou and Gansu. The
Dungans' food and cuisine are basically identical to those of the Hui people in
northwestern China, and their Islamic sects include all sects of China's Hui. Cultural
memory is also, e.g., reflected in the building of the mosques. ,For instance, the "Shaanxi
Grand Mosque" in Masanchi has its door facing east. According to Liuwa Baiyanhu/Bai
Liuwa (/iuwa means the sixth child; usually the full name of the grandfather was turned
into a Dungan surname by the third generation reflecting the process of Russification, and
this surname might disappear completely and replaced by a Russian surname by the
fourth generation"), the grandson of Bai Yanhu, who is a Qadim, "When we pray we face
Mecca, while the door of the mosque faces our old hometown in China." (fieldwork
interview, 2001/2002).
Interestingly, the Dungans' pattern of settlement and domicile is characterized by
provincial origin and sect. The Dungans in Kazakhstan's Masanchi (Ingpan) and Sotorbe
(Xinqu) are of Shaanxi origin, those in Kyrgyzstan's Sokuluk are mainly of Gansu origin,
those in Kazakhstan's Zhambyl are mainly from Qinghai, and those in Kazakhstan's
Zhalpak-tobe are mainly from Xinjiang. In 1877, when Ayub Bai Yanhu and his
followers camped at a site 9 km from Tokrnok, at the foot of the Alatau ranges, the
Russian government allocated 58000 rubles for them to build houses. During the
distribution of land, money and property, long-simmering internal contradictions rose to
the surface. The puzzled Kazakh officials in-charge at that time divided these Chinese
migrants into the pro-Bai Yanhu Ashi and the anti-Bai Yanhu Aman (meaning "bad" in
the Kazakh language). The Dungans there, including those in Masanchi (Ingpan) and the
neighbouring areas, have since consisted of the two factions of "Ashi" and "Aman"
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which also took on religious sectarian flavour - the "Aman" being Ikhwan and the "Ashi"
being Qadim.
Sortobe (Xinqu) is one of the five largest settlement of the Dungans - the other
four being Masanchin (Ingpan), Zhalpak-tobe, Miliangchuan and Sokuluk (including the
adjacent Aleksandrovka). The over ten thousand people of Sortobe are mostly
descendants of the Dungan migrants, hence the lingua franca there is the Shaanxi
regionalect. Sortobe is the result of the branching out of the first major Dungan
settlement, Ingpan, after the latter had grown too crowded. Later, more and more Dungan
farms were born, branching out from Sortobe. Among them, two became the new Dungan
\
farms only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the exodus of
their main population who were German descendants, their houses and land being then
bought up by the Dungans. The Dungans in Sortobe are almost all vegetable farmers and
vegetable vendors, though there are businessmen among them too. Some have moved to
farm vegetables in Belarus, Ukraine, Moscow and Siberia, allegedly being attracted by
high vegetable prices and hence good income there. There are also in Sortobe Sino-
Kazakhs, Sino-Kyrgyz and Sino-Uzbeks who can still speak fluent Shaanxi regionalect
(fieldwork, 2001/2002), who are known as erzhuanzi (those with the mixed blood of two
ethnicities) and sanzhuanzi (mixed with three ethnicities) - terms which are usually
considered as somehow impolite or derogatory.
Living in compact communities is part of the legacy of the first generation of
these political and war refugees from northwestern China. As related by Bai Liuwa,
Mohammad Ayub Bai Yanhu's grandson living in Masanchin (Ingpan), there had been
unwillingness among these refugees of not settling in the cities but instead in the desolate
Karakunuz (the former name of Masanchin, meaning "breeding place of black beetles" in
the Kyrgyz language). His grandfather then convinced them that this was a good place to
settle because, firstly, the terrain would facilitate their escape in case the Ch'ing army
pursued across the border, and secondly, being such a huge number of refugees, conflicts
would be unavoidable in the long term if they were to stay together with the local people;
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hence, staying apart from the local people was a better option (fieldwork interview,
200112002).
Heiyazi Lan'ahong, an intellectual in Masanchin, explained that Ingpan (i.e.
Masanchin) was much higher in terrain than Tokmok. Watching out from Ingpan to the
direction of Tokmok, which is on the ancient Silk Road that linked China in the East and
Uzbekistan in the west, there was nowhere for the enemy to hide. For the refugee
migrants led by Bai Yanhu, they were ready to escape into the mountains at the back of
Ingpan on the first sign of attack. Leaving Tokmok to camp at Ingpan made strategic
sense, and in fact, "Ingpan" meant an army camp - it was a c?mpact community of the
generation of comrades who had fought together for 17 years before fleeing the Ch'ing
Empire to continue to stay closely together and take care of each other (fieldwork
interview, 200112002). The plain, pastoral life of the Dungans is also reflected in their
impressive hospitality to guests especially those from their ancestral homeland of
Shaanxi (and Gansu), a unique characteristic that has been repeatedly pointed out by
visitors to their villages, for instance, as highlighted in Liu (2004)'s sentimental lyrical
travelogue, Bei Yue Tianshan [Sad exodus over the Heavenly Mountain]. The same
heartwarming hospitality was also vividly recorded by Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer who
visited 'the Dungans twenty years earlier: "During my stay in Frunze, Alma-Ata and the
kolkhozes, I was treated with friendliness and overwhelming hospitality [and the
Dungans] went out of their way to make my stay as fruitful and interesting as possible
[ ... ]" (Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 51).
The Dungan language is particularly unique in the fact that it is the only variety of
the Chinese language which is not written in Chinese characters. The drastic break with
the Overseas Chinese in other parts of the world in writing system is incidental. The
50000 speakers of the Dungan language in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan actually call their language XY3U3Y uyJlll [xwsitsu jyjan]
(huizu yuyan) (or Romanized Huejzw jyian; in Russian 0YllZaHCKUu mblK I dunganskij
jazyk) which means "language of the Hui". There are two, mutually intelligible, varieties
of the Dungan language - the Gansu regionalect with three tones (to be more exact, three
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tones in the final position in phonetic words and four tones in the nonfinal position)
which serves as the standard, official, textbook form of the Dungan language, and the
other which is the Shaanxi regionalect with four tones, However, standard Dungan's
three tones are not indicated in writing, except in dictionaries and children's primers,
where the second and third tones are marked by the Cyrillics band b respectively (e.g.
Ma, Mal>,Mah) or alternatively by adding I, II and III (e.g. Ma I, Ma II, Ma III). The Dungan
language originally used a version of the Arabic alphabet called "Xiao'erjing", and then a
writing system composed of 35 Arabic letters introduced by Muslim students in Toshkent
in 1927, but when the Soviet Union banned all Arabic scripts in the late 1920s it switched
to the Latin alphabet in 1928 after that year's Convention on Turkic Studies in Baku
\
which spearheaded the Latinization campaign in the Turkic world produced a Latinized
alphabet of 31 letters for the Dungan language - the writing system in which Yasir
Shiwaza (51.111HBa3aJIasyrShivaza) (1906-1988), founder of Dungan literature, published
his first anthology of Dungan poems in 1931. "Shiwaza"/"Shivaza" is from Chinese
shiwazi, meaning "the tenth child" - reflecting a usual way of naming a child among the
early Dungans. Then at a conference on 27th May 1953 in Frunze, Kirghiz Soviet
Socialist Republic (or Kirghizia, later the independent Republic of Kyrgyzstan after
1991), a system of writing Dungan in a Cyrillic alphabet with 38 letters was devised and
has since been in use from 1953 till today. The "Xiao'erjing" Arabic alphabet which
remains in limited use today by some Hui communities in China is practically dead
among the Dungans.
Long isolation from China, written in an alphabet instead of Chinese characters,
and significant influence from Russian and the Turkic languages of their neighbours have
led to the Dungan language taking on a distinctive identity of its own, though this archaic
form of Shaanxi/Gansu regionalect is today still mutually intelligible with the present
Shaanxi and Gansu tongues of the two Chinese provinces. Soviet census statistics had
revealed that the Dungans seemed to have maintained the use of their mother tongue
much more successfully as compared with the other ethnic minorities in the Central
Asian SSRs (soviet socialist republics). The Dungan language is very similar to China's
putonghua (Mandarin), being a variety of Zhongyuan Mandarin (vis-it-vis Lan-Yin
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Mandarin) spoken in the southern part of Gansu province and the western part of the
Guanzhong valley in Shaanxi province. While basically mutually intelligible with today's
Gansu or Shaanxi regionalects, like Bahasa Malaysia vis-a-vis Bahasa Indonesia or Urdu
vis-a-vis Hindi, Dungan vocabulary contains many Arabic and Persian loanwords not
present in modern Chinese, as well as, like being trapped in a time capsule due to the
isolation, many archaic terms of the Ch'ing-dynasty era which are no longer in use in
modern Chinese. On the other hand, the large number of political, scientific and other
technical terms introduced into the Chinese language during the 20th century, including
neologisms and a huge number of earlier ones adopted from Japanese kanji compounds,
are unknown to the Dungan language (partly due to geopolitical isolation and partly to
\
the orthographical barrier) which instead borrowed such related vocabulary from
Russian, the language medium of political governance and higher education in the former
USSR. To use the term "time capsule" is not an exaggeration. The prominent scholar in
China on Dungans Professor Wang Guojie reported that in his first visit to an old Dungan
in Uzbekistan in 1990, the old man, in full surprise, asked Wang, "Ni shi cong Da Qing
Guo lai de? ... Zuo Zongtang de ren hai zai bu?" [Are you from the Ch'ing Empire? ...
Are [the Ch'ing General] Zuo Zongtang's people still there?]7 Today's visitors to the
Dungan villages sometimes still report the same question about Zuo Zongtang being
posed to them. In fact, it is reported that in these villages culturally virtually trapped in
the late-Ch'ing era, when children throw tantrums, sometimes the adults' response to stop
their crying is to warn them that Zuo Zongtang will come to kill them if they do not stop
crying! (Li, 2008)
Dungans in the Local Environment: Identity, Relations and Interactions
While the Central Asian states are now facing the problem of sharp decline in birth rate,
the Dungans' birth rate remains high. The second generation usually had about 7 to 15
children per family, partly due to the encouragement from the Soviet government.
Among the farming families in Masanchi, Sotorbe and Sokuluk, many Dungan women
are "hero mothers" who had given birth to more than 10 children. As observed in
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Vansvanova (2000) in the case of Kazakhstan, a Dungan rural family each still had about
5 or 6 children, though in the 1980s the number was 7 or 8. Vansvanova also noted that
there were more than 300 "hero mother" in Masanchi and Sortobe. These refugee-
migrants were originally peasants in Shaanxi and Gansu, hence the vast land in Central
Asia had proven to be to their advantage. For instance in Masanchi, the first-generation
migrants purchased some farming equipment with settlement subsidies from the local
government as well as crafted some others for the planting of vegetables and wheat, and
were out of poverty in just a few years. Sharing the common trait of overseas Chinese
elsewhere, these hardworking and persevering Dungans had managed to enjoy a
relatively high standard of living during the Soviet times. While being of Shaan-Gan
peasant origin, the Dungans were also good at business besides farming. It was reported
that before the October Revolution, streets of the prosperous "Chinatown" in Bishkek,
Kirghizia, were lined with restaurants. Even today, Dungan (Shaan-Gan) cuisine is very
well known in the Central Asian states where the Dungans reside. According to Russin
Darurov An in the 2004 interview, there were more than 30 Shaanxi (Dungan) restaurants
in Kazakhstan's capital Astana and the business was very good." Astana is Kazakhstan's
capital since 1997, after the government moved the capital from the country's largest
city, Almaty. In the campaign against the rich after the Revolution, these shrewd Dungan
businessmen were chased out of the city and became successful farmers of Miliangchuan.
In farming, the Dungans have preserved the primordial traditions of peasantry till the
today. In Kyrgyzstan and in fact throughout Central Asia, the Dungans are well
recognized as hard-working peasants producing high-quality rice, fruits and vegetables.
Originally being the people who introduced farming and vegetable-growing knowledge
and practices into a Central Asia populated with nomads, Dungan's vegetables and other
agricultural products practically dominate or even "monopolize" Central Asia's local
food markets in Almaty and Biskek and elsewhere, giving rise to the local joke that if the
Dungans refuse to work, there would be no fresh vegetables found on any family's dining
table.
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During the hundred years of the Dungans' residence in Soviet Central Asia,
Dungan names have undergone distinctive transformation under Russian influence,
usually with a Russified Muslim first name (with the typical Russian name-suffixes)
followed by the paternal last name (family name). A typical Dungan family name is often
a combination of a Chinese surname (e.g. Bai as in "Bai Yanhu") and a distinctive noun
(e.g. derived from ancestral calling, say, Baizhangguide or Suo 'ahong whose ancestors
could respectively be a shopkeeper and an imam). Some Dungans have kept the Shaanxi
Hui tradition of nicknames, like Heiyazi ("black teeth"), Wuwa ("the fifth child"), Liuwa
("the sixth child"), etc. The second-generation and third-generation Dungans are very
different from their first-generation migrant forefathers. While the first-generation
\
migrants were mostly illiterate peasants, the cultural level of the Dungans has risen since
the second generation, during Soviet times. According to the Soviet Union's 1976
population census, out of the 80000 Dungans there were 4 professors and 40 associate
professors - the Dungans hence at that time represented the ethnic group with the highest
education level among the 120 ethnic minorities of the Soviet Union.
Phenotypically, alternate-generation heredity is common among the Dungans,
partly because of the huge casualty incurred during the exodus through the harsh
Tianshan - e.g. among Bai Yanhu's followers, about three quarters or 27000 people were
killed in the harsh climate on the snow mountain, only 3314 survived when they emerged
on the other side of the mountain on 27th December 1877, days after they began the
fateful trek through the 3800-meter high snow mountain in harsh winter - but partly also
because there were among them less womenfolk many of whom were victims of
footbinding at that time and were thus unable to scale the formidable mountain roads."
Hence, with the approval of the Czarist government, many early Dungan migrants had
married Russian, Kazakh and Kyrgyz women (Li, 2008).
The Dungans are good farmers. Due to the high prices of vegetables and fruits in
the Central Asian region, and the short distance between the major Dungan villages such
as Masanchi and Sortobe by the Chui River and the big cities like Bishkek and Almaty
Oust about 60 km and 268 km respectively), vegetable farming brought good income
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yearly for the Dungans. Hence, compared to their local Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek
neighbours, the Dungans are comparatively rich, with an average of two private cars per
family (Zhi, 2004). Hence, through farming and peasantry, the Dungans are now among
the wealthiest rural dwellers. Since 1994, through the effort and initiative of the Dungan
Association of Kazakhstan's president Hussin Darurov An, modem technology and
equipments (e.g. greenhouse) for the production of vegetables, especially mushroom,
brick, biscuits, paint etc. have been imported on a large scale into the Dungan villages
from China's Shaanxi province, a phenomenon that made the Dungan villages a sort of
celebrity in Kazakhstan via newspaper and television reports and attracted the visits of
Kazakhstan's Members of Parliament, Minister of Agriculture, Governor of Zhambyl
Province, and gained An an audience with the president of Kazakhstan (Zhi, 2004).
The Kyrgyz have in fact adopted quite remarkably some features of the Dungan
culture, especially the Dungan cuisine and farming skills which have actually been well
incorporated in daily life throughout northern Kyrgyzstan.
Rimski-KorsakoffDyer (1981: 43-44) noted the Dungans' ability to "Dunganize"
people, i.e. to convert people of other ethnicities to Dungan food, custom and speech.
Despite the multiethnic mixture of the kolkhozes she visited, they were regarded as
"Dungan" kolkozes for the fact 1) the Dungans were in majority, 2) the key figures
(kolkhoz and village chairmen, doctors, librarians and teachers) were nearly all Dungans,
and 3) this "Dunganization" ability through mixed marriages or just everyday contact
with those around them. Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer wondered if such "Dunganization" of
the people in close contact with the Dungans is connected to the similar historical ability
of the Chinese culture that Sinicized the Mongols and the Manchu who at one time or
another conquered Chinese territory.
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Impact of the New Chinese Migrants
The phenomenon of the new Chinese migrants in Central Asia mainly began since the
establishment of formal diplomatic relationship between China and the new CIS
countries in the region. For instance, the large-scale influx of the new Chinese migrants
into Kazakhstan can be traced back to the establishment of diplomatic relationship
between China and Kazakhstan in 1992. According to Liu (2009), advancement in
bilateral economic relations, with trade volume increasing at an annual rate of above 30
\
per cent, and the steady increase of China's investment in Kazakhstan, with over 300
Chinese enterprises having registered in Kazakhstan by the end of 2006 and the total
amount of China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kazakhstan reaching US$1.54
billion for the period of 2002-2007, has acted as strong stimulus for the huge influx of
Chinese workers into Kazakhstan. Besides, since 1992, a total of over 3.1 million former
inhabitants have left Kazakhstan to return to their "historic nation", and out of the net
emigrants totaling about 2 million people 63-65 per cent are within the working age
cohort and about 45 per cent are those university graduates or having professional
diplomas. This has led to an acute shortage in the industrial, agricultural, education,
medical and various other sectors in Kazakhstan especially during the economic recovery
since 2000.
In terms of demography, the population's natural growth rate has been unstable
and in fact dropping. For instance, the population of Kazakhstan in 2005 was 15.1 million
(with a natural growth rate of 0.01218 million), was expected to reach only 15.4 million
by 2025 but to decline to 13.9 million by 2050. Economic recovery has led to continuous
increase in demand for labour from abroad given its acute domestic labour shortage, and
in terms of attracting migrants, the World Bank has placed Kazakhstan as the world's
number nine. As Kazakhstan's neighbour sharing a long land border, China is well poised
as a migrant labour supplier for Kazakhstan. With visa exemption for Chinese business
visitors since Kazakhstan's independence from the former USSR, the number of Chinese
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business migrants soon reached the peak during the period of 1989-1993. In fact,
Kazakhstan's custom figures shows that from 1993 to 1995 there were 150-200 Chinese
"tourists" entering Kazakhstan every day, and out of these about 30-50 people were
staying on in Kazakhstan, taking up permanent residence there or moving on to other CIS
(ex-USSR) countries or the Western countries. Official estimates put the number of
Chinese citizens migrating into Kazakhstan or using Kazakhstan as a migration transit
point during the three-year period at not less than 0.13-0.15 million.
The Chinese new migrants in Kazakhstan have various unique characteristics: the
rapid increase in number since the beginning of the 21 st Century; the great varieties of
the pattern of mobility; the rapid expansion of the volumes of both legal and illegal
migrant labour; the coexistence of "commercial migrants" and "mobile vendors"; the
mixed ethnic composition of these migrants who include not only the Han Chinese, but
also China's Kazakhs, Uighurs and other ethnic groups; the continuous strengthening of
Chinese social networking in organizing migration and commercial activities.
Kazakhstan's laerge-scale import of foreign labour began in 1993, mostly from Turkey,
China, Russia, US and UK. Of the 2100 foreign labour in 1993, a total of 559 (26.7 per
cent) were from China. There was a rapid increase in foreign labour during the period
2004-2006, reaching 40897 by 2006, including 5008 (12.2 per cent) from China. Hence
from 1993 to 2006, the number of Chinese migrant labour in Kazakhstan had increased
ninefold. During the period 2004-2006 alone, the number of Chinese migrant labour
increased from 1457 to 5008, with an increase of 3.4 times. Besides, according to
Kazakhstan's immigration statistics, there were 46000 Chinese entering Kazakhstan in
2000, and 103700 during the first ten months of 2006, including a huge number of those
without working agreements or contracts. Hence, the real number of Chinese migrant
labour in Kazakhstan could be far higher than the official statistics released by both
countries. While such migration is in fact two-way, with over 1.3 million Kazakhstan
migrants now staying in China (99 per cent of them in Xinjiang), constituting
Kazakhstan's largest migrant community abroad, the large-scale Chinese influx into
Kazakhstan has attracted acute resentment from the local Kazakhs and raised the fear of
25
Yeoh, Liu & Fan International Conference on Chinese Migrants' Descendants 23-24 March 2011
"Sino-cization" and of being an instrument for China to reduce its population surplus, of
resource exploitation and of being a dumping target for Chinese goods (ibid).
In the recent large-scale mass protest involving about 2000 people, organized by
Kazakhstan's opposition, including the United Social Democratic Party (Kazakhstan
largest opposition party), Kazakh Communist Party, Kazakh Liberal Party, Progressive
Movement, the independent labour union activist organization Social Defense and the
Kazakh nationalistic forces, the participants demonstrated against "Chinese capitalist
expansion" in Kazakhstan and the Kazakh government's plan to lease land to China,
referring to the Kazakh president's revelation at a FDI meeting of China's suggestion to
\
lease one million hectare of land from Kazakhstan for planting crops and Kazakhstan's
counter-suggestion of reducing it to 200000 hectares for joint-ventures for this purpose.
The land targeted for leasing are in four provinces including the province of Almaty and
the province of South Kazakhstan. The protesters saw this leasing as a national security
issue that would, in addition to the large-scale invasion by Chinese capital and the large-
scale Chinese acquisition of Kazakh energy and resource company shares, lead to large-
scale Chinese migration into Kazakhstan and the turning of Kazakhstan into China's
transport base for energy and resources. On the banners in the demonstration, the
protesters drew a Chinese dragon over the Kazakh national emblem and Mao Zedong's
head on Kazakh currency to signify Chinese capitalist expansion and the threat of
Chinese colonialism. However, there were no extreme slogans that directly attacked
China or asked the Chinese people to leave Kazakhstan.10
Similarly, in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan which was declared by the United Nations
in 2005 as one of the world's poorest countries, the over 10000 Chinese new migrants
(mostly migrant workers) residing in Bishkek and the southern part of the country
(mainly ethnic Uighurs from western China) had attracted resentment from the Kyrgyz,
which was manifested in several attacks, often fatal, on these Chinese migrant workers,
including a race-hatred murder that occurred shortly following the former Kyrgyz
president Askar Akayev's ceding of 87000 hectares of the country's southern territories
to China for the settlement of a border dispute (Marat, 2008). In fact, Chinese merchants
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and migrant workers (mostly Muslim Uighurs) were living in secluded areas in Bishkek,
apart from the local Kyrgyz residents.
These latest events involving the influx of the new Chinese migrants will
definitely have an impact upon the Dungans - an issue that will be discussed in the next
section.
Concluding Remarks
The future of the Dungans in the Central Asian states especially in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan where they exist in large numbers depends on a nexus of many factors to
which the impact of the phenomenon of the new Chinese migrants is but a latest addition.
To think that the recent backlash by the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz against these new Chinese
migrants would also adversely affect the Kazakh-Dungan and Kyrgyz-Dungan relations
may be premature. The close relationship developed between the Dungans and the
Kazakhs/Kyrgyz over the hundred years of staying together in Kazakhstan and
Kirghizia/Kyrgyzstan should be more closely examined in relation to their century-long
isolation from China. The Dungans' cultural memory includes an element of historical
gratitude towards the Russians, the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz who took their forefathers in
when they had nowhere to go, freshly escaping from the genocidal army of Zuo
Zongtang, gave them land, exempt them from taxes, thus giving them a new lease of life
in this foreign land. On the other hand, the Dungans' ethnic allegiance with the Chinese
across the borders could be intriguing. Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer recorded her surprise
when during her visit she was told by her Dungan hosts that
[The Dungan language] was an independent language, phonetically and syntactically quite
different from Chinese, and that there are two "Dungan" dialects - the Kansu and Shensi
dialects, which are quite different from the Kansu and Shensi dialects in China. There was
also "Dungan" food which the Dungans thought was different from the Chinese food and yet,
to me, as one who lived in China for many years, many of the dishes were familiar ones I had
eaten in China quite frequently.
(Rimski-KorsakoffDyer, 1981: 51)
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While Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer's conclusion that "the Dungans have turned their backs on
present-day China and have cut their ties with the country in which their ancestors lived"
might be disputed by some other scholars of Dungan studies, especially those in China, it
is worth noting that it was derived from observation at a time when the Dungans were
prospering, "both as city dwellers and collective farmers, under Soviet rule [and they] are
happy and settled and have no need to look back into the past with longing" (ibid.).
Ethnic allegiance is fluid. The Bosnian Muslims' ethnic ties with Christian Slavs were
supplanted by religious solidarity with the Muslim world only after the collapse of
Yugoslavia brought about their agonizing defeat in the ensuing ethnic war, and similarly,
the Pomaks' ethnic identification with Muslim Turks rather than Slavic Christian
\
Bulgarians results mainly from the socioeconomic discrimination they suffer (Yeoh,
2003: 27). When politico-economic circumstances undergo drastic changes, ethnic
allegiance may not be as ascriptive as ethnic identity itself. "Based on the current
situation I do not think that there will be a conflict, if so what can I do? Go back to
China?" - a 23-year-old ethnic Dungan, Mahmud, was cited commenting on the
uncertain future facing Kyrgyzstan's ethnic minorities caused by the ethnic tension-filled
presidential poll in 2005. 11 Besides Dungan prosperity mentioned above, Rimski-
Korsakoff Dyer had derived her conclusion of Dungans' rejection of China based on
another four reasons: their century-long residence in the Russian Empire/Soviet Union;
their memory that Hui Muislims were suppressed and massacred by Chinese/Chinese
government during the Ch'ing dynasty; being an exiled community attempting to
preserve their ethnic identity had led to extreme conservatism and
nationalism/ethnocentrism; being a small ethnic minority had led to the consciousness to
be regarded as an independent community speaking an independent language, "hence
their use of 'Dungan language', 'Dungan dialects', 'Dungan people', 'Dungan food',
'Dungan vinegar" (Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 51-52). However, the recent
economic rise of China and the increasing contact between these once isolated people and
Shaanxi and Gansu where their forefathers came from - in terms of both tourism and
commerce - might have affected ethnic allegiance. According to Hussin Darurov
Shimarovich (An), the president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan (who is also a
Member of the People's Committee of Kazakhstan and the Chairman of the Dungan
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Kolkhoz (collective farm) of Zhambyl Province), in an interview in 2004, after the
former president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan visited Shaanxi in 1989, news
about the ancestral homeland of Shaanxi, China, had spread among the Dungan, thanks
much to a special "home-going" feature in the Dungan Press, there had been great
interest and enthusiasm among the Dungan there to visit or return to the homeland,
despite the troublesome procedures.i'' Similarly, the feeling of the Dungans themselves
towards the uniqueness of their language as being a Chinese language not written in
Chinese characters could be much more mixed than as Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer reported
earlier in 1981. As Hussin Darurov An said in the 2004 interview, there is no lack of the
feeling of disadvantage and regret that while the Shaanxi( -Gansu) regionalect was very
well preserved among the Dungans, it was indeed unfortunate that the Chinese writing
system was not preserved as well, and there had been meetings and agreement signings
during his trips to Shaanxi to set a priority for education, paving the way for
Kazakhstan's Dungans to come to China "to learn the mother tongue". 13 In fact, the
Dungan students were enjoying the preferential treatment provided by the Shaanxi
provincial government who treated them as local rather than foreign students in terms of
school fees. In the words of An, "We are scared that if we lose the language, then we
would not be able to go home." "Home", as An referred to, was of course Shaanxi
Province, China. There is indeed a less romantic, rather mundane and practical aspect, as
An also highlighted in the interview. As a lot of goods are imported from China today
into Kazakhstan and Central Asia at large, it is thus useful for the Dungan youths to learn
modern Chinese. Every year since 2000, An has been sending some children from the
Dungan villages to Xi'an, China, to learn Chinese who will later come back to teach
others, and it is considered by the parents as a great honour if their children were selected
for this." As one of the most important contributors to cultural distinctions, education has
been seen as pseudoethnicity, said to be "a subcase of the same processes that also
produce ethnicity", according to Collins (1975: 86) who further remarked:
Schools everywhere are established originally to pass on a particular form of religion or elite
class culture, and are expanded in the interests of political indoctrination or ethnic hegemony.
In these situations, education is nothing more than ethnic or class culture, although it can be
taught to those who are not born into it.
(Collins, 1975: 87)
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Seeing education, especially cultural and language education, in this light, the long-term
impact of such educational arrangement for Dungan children on the re-Sinicization of the
Dungans could probably not be easily dismissed.
That said, there remains the possible contention between ethnoreligious allegiance
and ethnolinguistic allegiance - here referring to the two "cultural" components of ethnic
boundary as a process that tends to be tenacious and uncompromising, the manifestation
of the age-old fourfold ascriptive loyalty of race, territoriality, language and religion
(Yeoh, 2006b: 224). The strength of the, co-religionist ties between the Dungans and their
Muslim neighbours in the Central Asian states may not be taken for granted. Such ties
may break down during a time of political instability and economic turmoil or
deprivation, when acute resource contest for politico-economic survival may take
precedence, as amply attested by the deadly Kyrgyz-Uzbek clash in 1991 that claimed
more than 300 lives in Kirghizia (Kyrgyzstan). Sectarian distrust is another crucial issue.
Going back to the early history of Dungan migration, there had been an apparent
sectarian element in the 1800s' Muslim revolt. Infighting between different Muslim Sufi
sects, namely the Khufiyya, the Jahariyya and the Qadim, allegedly had played an
important role in the revolt. Intrusion of Sufism into China has been said to have led to
massive tension among the Hui people, and the 1862-1877 Muslim revolt and a
subsequent one have been attributed mainly to the Muslim inter-sect fighting. During the
1862-1877 revolt, Qadim Hanafi Sunni Muslims had tried to distance themselves from
the Jahriyya Sufi rebels, and some of the Qadim Muslims even helped the Ch'ing dynasty
to crush the Sufi rebels. Hui Chinese Muslims also participated in attacks on the Muslim
Uyghurs and several Chinese Muslim Generals defected to the Ch'ing government and
assisted Ch'ing forces in attacking the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Commenting on the case of
Xinjiang as being much more complicated than a simple Muslim struggle for
independence against Han colonizers, Dru C. Gladney cautioned:
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Poor past relations between the three main Muslim groups, Uyghur, Kazak, and Hui, suggest
that conflicts among Muslims would be as great as those between Muslims and Han Chinese.
Most local residents believe that independence would lead to significant conflicts between
these groups, along ethnic, religious, urban-rural, and territorial lines,
Gladney (2003: 24-25)
While Geertz (1963: 109) saw that the "congruities of [the primordial attachments of]
blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times
overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves", the Weberian approach views ethnic
group as being not "natural" (as kinship group is) but "rational" and primarily political:
Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a
presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic
membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind,
particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community,
no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity.
(Weber, 1968 tL15: 389)
In this light, ethnicity can be seen in intergroup relations not as a '''given' of social
existence", but a political construct linked directly to power relations and resource
competition, and a boundary marker frequently mobilized to meet the rising need of
identity investment for economic and political purposes (Yeoh, 2010b: 576). If the recent
Kazakh and Kyrgyz backlash against the perceived Chinese capitalist expansion and the
influx of the new Chinese migrants were to spread to the communities of Dungan
migrants' descendants, Mahmud's worries, as cited earlier above, may not be farfetched,
especially after the severe Kyrgyz-Dungan clashes in Iskra on 6th February 2010. In such
a context, with increasing contact between the once isolated Dungans and their ethnic
brethren in northwestern China, the prospect of a process of re-Sinicization - in a way
representing the undoing of the long process of Dungan identity creation that germinated
more than a hundred years ago when Bai Yanhu and his people first crossed the
Tianshan, and culminated in a partly State-sponsored ethnogenesis during Soviet times -
cannot be ruled out, thus overturning the conscious isolation from China "by indifference
on the part of most of the collective farmers and hostility on the part of some of the
Dungan scholars" that Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer observed two decades ago (Rimski-
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Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 51). Even without the ominous shadow of impending majority
oppression, such a re-ethnicization still makes economic sense, given the growing
economic power of China. For instance, Hussin Darurov An, president of the Dungan
Association of Kazakhstsan, has talked about the plan to build a monument and a
memorial hall for the great Tang-dynasty poet Li Bai (Li Po) in his Dungan village'",
although the birthplace of Li Bai, the ancient Suiyecheng, was actually a few kilometers
away in Kyrgyzstan at what is today Tokmok. Cultural memory aside, the plan is of
course good for tourism. Ultimately, the economic situations in these Central Asian states
would playa crucial role in determining the future course of interethnic relations which
would in turn impact upon the Dungans' dilemma between preserving a creat~d identity -
the fruit of their unique process of ethnogenesis - and re-Sinicization, for economic
deprivation or desperate poverty tends to unduly heighten sensitivity and engender an
atmosphere of unreasonableness and interethnic distrust, and as economic conditions
deteriorates the greater would be the tendency for separate ethnic groups to coalesce
along the lines of collective interests leading to acute societal polarization while the
publics become more receptive to scapegoat myths (Yeoh, 2010a: 16, 62) like those
going around blaming the new Chinese migrants for taking up jobs in Kyrgyzstan and
squeezing out the local population - perceptions that were apparently behind those
racially motivated brutal, sometimes fatal, attacks on the Chinese migrants in Bishkek.
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